scarcely necessary to present to the Senate these views
of the power of the Executive and of the duties of the five directors
appointed by the United States. But the bank is believed to be now
striving to obtain for itself the government of the country, and is
seeking by new and strained constructions to wrest from the hands of the
constituted authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter;
and as misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack,
I have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate in a manner not to be
misunderstood the principles on which I have acted.

Entertaining as I do a solemn conviction of the truth of these
principles, I must adhere to them and act upon them with constancy and
firmness. Aware as I now am of the dangerous machinations of the bank,
it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the rights of
the people from the impending danger. And I should feel that I ought to
forfeit the confidence with which my countrymen have honored me if I did
not require regular and full reports of everything in the proceedings
of the bank calculated to affect injuriously the public interests from
the public directors; and if the directors should fail to give the
information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise
the power conferred on me by law of removing them from office and of
appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to
the public. I can never suffer anyone to hold office under me who would
connive at corruption or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw
the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free
institutions and to subject the free people of the United States to the
dominion of a great moneyed corporation.

Any directors of the bank, therefore, who might be appointed by the
Government would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the
late directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is
more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail
of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its
officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should
exercise the power of ordering a _scire facias_, which is reserved to
the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the
interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted
that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought