egarded as the acts intended to be denounced as
"an assumption of authority and power not conferred by the Constitution
or laws, but in derogation of both." It is therefore due to the occasion
that a condensed summary of the views of the Executive in respect to
them should be here exhibited.

By the Constitution "the executive power is vested in a President
of the United States." Among the duties imposed upon him, and which he
is sworn to perform, is that of "taking care that the laws be faithfully
executed." Being thus made responsible for the entire action of the
executive department, it was but reasonable that the power of
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws--a
power in its nature executive--should remain in his hands. It is
therefore not only his right, but the Constitution makes it his duty,
to "nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoint" all "officers of the United States whose appointments are not
in the Constitution otherwise provided for," with a proviso that the
appointment of inferior officers may be vested in the President alone,
in the courts of justice, or in the heads of Departments.

The executive power vested in the Senate is neither that of "nominating"
nor "appointing." It is merely a check upon the Executive power of
appointment. If individuals are proposed for appointment by the
President by them deemed incompetent or unworthy, they may withhold
their consent and the appointment can not be made. They check the
action of the Executive, but can not in relation to those very subjects
act themselves nor direct him. Selections are still made by the
President, and the negative given to the Senate, without diminishing his
responsibility, furnishes an additional guaranty to the country that the
subordinate executive as well as the judicial offices shall be filled
with worthy and competent men.

The whole executive power being vested in the President, who is
responsible for its exercise, it is a necessary consequence that he
should have a right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the
performance of his duties, and to discharge them when he is no longer
willing to be responsible for their acts. In strict accordance with this
principle, the power of removal, which, like that of appointment, is
an original executive power, is left unchecked by the Constitution in
relation to all executive officers, for whose conduct the President
is res