unnational complexion) within the body of the Empire. All history shows
that such an arrangement, however hedged in by the most solemn treaties
and declarations, cannot last. In this case it would lead to a tragic
issue. The absorption of Polonism is unthinkable. The last hundred
years of European History proves it undeniably. There remains then
extirpation, a process of blood and iron; and the last act of the Polish
drama would be played then before a Europe too weary to interfere, and to
the applause of Germany.

It would not be just to say that the disappearance of Polonism would add
any strength to the Slavonic power of expansion. It would add no
strength, but it would remove a possibly effective barrier against the
surprises the future of Europe may hold in store for the Western Powers.

Thus the question whether Polonism is worth saving presents itself as a
problem of politics with a practical bearing on the stability of European
peace--as a barrier or perhaps better (in view of its detached position)
as an outpost of the Western Powers placed between the great might of
Slavonism which has not yet made up its mind to anything, and the
organised Germanism which has spoken its mind with no uncertain voice,
before the world.

Looked at in that light alone Polonism seems worth saving. That it has
lived so long on its trust in the moral support of the Western Powers may
give it another and even stronger claim, based on a truth of a more
profound kind. Polonism had resisted the utmost efforts of Germanism and
Slavonism for more than a hundred years. Why? Because of the strength
of its ideals conscious of their kinship with the West. Such a power of
resistance creates a moral obligation which it would be unsafe to
neglect. There is always a risk in throwing away a tool of proved
temper.

In this profound conviction of the practical and ideal worth of Polonism
one approaches the problem of its preservation with a very vivid sense of
the practical difficulties derived from the grouping of the Powers. The
uncertainty of the extent and of the actual form of victory for the
Allies will increase the difficulty of formulating a plan of Polish
regeneration at the present moment.

Poland, to strike its roots again into the soil of political Europe, will
require a guarantee of security for the healthy development and for the
untrammelled play of such institutions as she may be enabled to give to
herself.

Thos