rules paramount, not the genuine people, but the would-be something,
the half-civilized _gentlemen_. Above all, know-nothingism pervades
all around Scott, who is himself its grand master, and it nestles
there _par excellence_ in more than one way. It is, however, to be
seen how far this pure American-Scott military wisdom is something
real, transcendent. Up to this day, the pure Americanism, West Point
schoolboy's conceit, have not produced much. The defences of
Washington, so much clarioned as being the product of a high
conception and of engineering skill,--these defences are very
questionable when appreciated by a genuine military eye. A Russian
officer of the military engineers, one who was in the Crimea and at
Sebastopol, after having surveyed these defences here, told me that
the Russian soldiers who defended Sebastopol, and who learned what
ought to be defences, would prefer to fight outside than inside of the
Washington forts, bastions, defences, etc., etc., etc.

Doubtless many foreigners coming to this country are not much, but the
greatest number are soldiers who saw service and fire, and could be of
some use at the side of Scott's West Point greenness and presumption.

If we are worsted, then the fate of the men of faith in principles
will be that of Sisyphus, and the coming generation for half a century
will have uphill work.

If not McClellan himself, some intriguers around him already dream,
nay, even attempt to form a pure military, that is, a reckless,
unprincipled, unpatriotic party. These men foment the irritation
between the arrogance of the thus-called regular army, and the pure
abnegation of the volunteers. Oh, for battles! Oh, for battles!

Fremont wished at once to attack Fort Pillow and the city of Memphis.
It was a bold move, but the concerted civil and military wisdom
grouped around the President opposed this truly great military
conception.

Mr. Lincoln is pulled in all directions. His intentions are excellent,
and he would have made an excellent President for quiet times. But
this civil war imperatively demands a man of foresight, of prompt
decision, of Jacksonian will and energy. These qualities may be latent
in Lincoln, but do not yet come to daylight. Mr. Lincoln has no
experience of men and events, and no knowledge of the past. Seward's
influence over Lincoln may be explained by the fact that Lincoln
considers Seward as the alpha and omega of every kind of knowledge and
informatio