tion reached the
headquarters, Gen. Wadsworth asked permission to follow with his
brigade, during the night, the retreating enemy. But it was not
_strategy, not a matured plan_. If Gen. Wadsworth had been in command
of the army, not one of the rats from Manassas would have escaped.
The reasons are, that Gen. Wadsworth has a quick, clear, and
wide-encompassing conception of events and things, a clear insight,
and many other inborn qualities of mind and intellect.

The Congress has a large number of very respectable capacities, and
altogether sufficient for the emergencies, and the Congress would do
more good but for the impediments thrown in its way by the
double-dealing policy prevailing in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet and
administration. The majority in Congress represent well the spirit of
self-government. It is a pity that Congress cannot crush or purify the
administration.

All that passes here is maddening, and I am very grateful to my father
and mother for having endowed me with a frame which resists the blows.

The pursuit of the enemy abandoned, the basis of operations changed.
The rats had the best of Stanton. _Utinam sim falsus propheta_, but if
Stanton's influence is no more all-powerful, then there is an end to
the short period of successes. Mr. Lincoln's council wanted to be
animated by a pure and powerful spirit. Stanton was the man, but he is
not a match for impure intriguers. Also McClellan goes to Fortress
Monroe, to Yorktown, to the rivers. This plan reveals an utter
military imbecility, and its plausibility can only catch ----.

1st. Common sense shows that the rebels ought to be cut off from their
resources, that is, from railroads, and from communication with the
revolted States in the interior, and to be precipitated into the
ocean. To accomplish it our troops ought to have marched by land to
Richmond, and pushed the enemy towards the ocean. Now McClellan pushes
the rebels from the extremity towards the centre, towards the focus of
their basis,--exactly what they want.

I am sure that McClellan is allured to this strategy by the success of
the gunboats on the Mississippi. He wishes that the gunboats may take
Richmond, and he have the credit of it.

The Merrimac is still menacing in Hampton Roads, and may, some day or
other, play havoc with the transports. The communications by land are
always more preferable than those by water--above all for such a great
army. A storm, etc., may do great mischief.