ary 1878
to Sir Bartle Frere, the Government was fully conscious of the
existing necessity to protect the Transvaal and to maintain British
prestige in South Africa. The despatch runs: "It seems certain that
the Zulu king has derived from his messengers the unfortunate idea
that the Kaffirs are able to cope with the Colony on more than equal
terms, and this belief has, as was inevitable, produced a very
threatening change in his language and conduct towards the Transvaal
Government. It is only too probable that a savage chief such as
Cetchwayo, supported by a powerful army already excited by the
recent successes of a neighbouring tribe over the late Government of
the Transvaal, may now become fired with the idea of victory over
her Majesty's forces, and that a deliberate attempt upon her
Majesty's territories may ensue. Should this unfortunately happen,
you must understand that at whatever sacrifice it is imperatively
necessary that her Majesty's forces in Natal and the Transvaal must
be reinforced by the immediate despatch of the military and naval
contingents now operating in the Cape, or such portion of them as
may be required. This is necessary not only for the safety of the
Transvaal, for the defence of which her Majesty's Government are
immediately concerned, but also in the interest of the Cape, since
a defeat of the Zulu king would act more powerfully than any other
means in disheartening the native races of South Africa."

On this subject Sir H. Bulwer wrote: "There has been for the last
eight or nine months a danger of collision with the Zulus at any
moment." And in November 1878 he said: "The system of government in
the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement seems hopeless. We
should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetchwayo."

Consequently, Sir Bartle Frere was not surprised when all efforts to
reduce Cetchwayo to yield to British demand failed. As time went by
it became clear that enforcement of these demands must be placed in
the hands of Lord Chelmsford and the military authorities, and
accordingly, on the 10th of January 1879, the Commander-in-Chief of
the forces of South Africa crossed the frontier.

As the frontier extended for some two hundred miles, to assume a
purely defensive attitude would have been impossible. Our forces so
placed would not have been sufficiently strong to resist an attack
made at their own time and place by a horde of some ten to twenty
thousand Zulus. Lord Chel