e of
laying by pence?
F. So far from it, that I consider they act wisely, and I only wish
that the theory was nothing but the faithful image of this universal
practice. But, suppose now that you were the legislator, the absolute
king of a vast empire, where there were no gold mines.
B. No unpleasant fiction.
F. Suppose, again, that you were perfectly convinced of this,--that
wealth consists solely and exclusively in cash; to what conclusion would
you come?
B. I should conclude that there was no other means for me to enrich my
people, or for them to enrich themselves, but to draw away the cash from
other nations.
F. That is to say, to impoverish them. The first conclusion, then, to
which you would arrive would be this,--a nation can only gain when
another loses.
B. This axiom has the authority of Bacon and Montaigne.
F. It is not the less sorrowful for that, for it implies--that
progress is impossible. Two nations, no more than two men, cannot
prosper side by side.
B. It would seem that such is the result of this principle.
F. And as all men are ambitious to enrich themselves, it follows that
all are desirous, according to a law of Providence, of ruining their
fellow-creatures.
B. This is not Christianity, but it is political economy.
F. Such a doctrine is detestable. But, to continue, I have made you an
absolute king. You must not be satisfied with reasoning, you must act.
There is no limit to your power. How would you treat this
doctrine,--wealth is money?
B. It would be my endeavour to increase, incessantly, among my people
the quantity of cash.
F. But there are no mines in your kingdom. How would you set about it?
What would you do?
B. I should do nothing: I should merely forbid, on pain of death, that
a single crown should leave the country.
F. And if your people should happen to be hungry as well as rich?
B. Never mind. In the system we are discussing, to allow them to
export crowns would be to allow them to impoverish themselves.
F. So that, by your own confession, you would force them to act upon a
principle equally opposite to that upon which you would yourself act
under similar circumstances. Why so?
B. Just because my own hunger touches me, and the hunger of a nation
does not touch legislators.
F. Well, I can tell you that your plan would fail, and that no
superintendence would be sufficiently vigilant, when the people were
hungry, to prevent the crowns from going
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