urrence of any event in past time may be
ranged under two heads, which, for convenience' sake, I will speak of as
testimonial evidence and as circumstantial evidence. By testimonial
evidence I mean human testimony; and by circumstantial evidence I mean
evidence which is not human testimony. Let me illustrate by a familiar
example what I understand by these two kinds of evidence, and what is to
be said respecting their value.

Suppose that a man tells you that he saw a person strike another and
kill him; that is testimonial evidence of the fact of murder. But it is
possible to have circumstantial evidence of the fact of murder; that is
to say, you may find a man dying with a wound upon his head having
exactly the form and character of the wound which is made by an ax, and,
with due care in taking surrounding circumstances into account, you may
conclude with the utmost certainty that the man has been murdered; that
his death is the consequence of a blow inflicted by another man with
that implement. We are very much in the habit of considering
circumstantial evidence as of less value than testimonial evidence, and
it may be that, where the circumstances are not perfectly clear and
intelligible, it is a dangerous and unsafe kind of evidence; but it must
not be forgotten that, in many cases, circumstantial evidence is quite
as conclusive as testimonial evidence, and that, not unfrequently, it is
a great deal weightier than testimonial evidence. For example, take the
case to which I referred just now. The circumstantial evidence may be
better and more convincing than the testimonial evidence; for it may be
impossible, under the conditions that I have defined, to suppose that
the man met his death from any cause but the violent blow of an ax
wielded by another man. The circumstantial evidence in favor of a murder
having been committed, in that case, is as complete and as convincing as
evidence can be. It is evidence which is open to no doubt and to no
falsification. But the testimony of a witness is open to multitudinous
doubts. He may have been mistaken. He may have been actuated by malice.
It has constantly happened that even an accurate man has declared that a
thing has happened in this, that, or the other way, when a careful
analysis of the circumstantial evidence has shown that it did not happen
in that way, but in some other way.

We may now consider the evidence in favor of or against the three
hypotheses. Let me first