ars to be quite as old,
quite as primitive, as any conception whatever of theology. Now, whether
M. Comte be right in this preference of the phrenologist, we will not
stay to discuss--it were too wide a question; but thus much we can
briefly and indisputably show, that he utterly misconceives, as well as
underrates, the _kind of research_ to which psychologists are addicted.
As M. Comte's style is here unusually vivacious, we will quote the whole
passage. Are we uncharitable in supposing that the prospect of
demolishing, at one fell swoop, the brilliant reputations of a whole
class of Parisian _savans_, added something to the piquancy of the
style?

"Such has gradually become, since the time of Bacon, the
preponderance of the positive philosophy; it has at present
assumed indirectly so great an ascendant over those minds even
which have been most estranged from it, that metaphysicians
devoted to the study of our intelligence, can no longer hope to
delay the fall of their pretended science, but by presenting
their doctrines as founded also upon the observation of facts.
For this purpose they have, in these later times, attempted to
distinguish, by a very singular subtilty, two sorts of
observations of equal importance, the one external, the other
internal; the last of which is exclusively destined for the
study of intellectual phenomena. This is not the place to enter
into the special discussion of this sophism. I will limit
myself to indicate the principal consideration, which clearly
proves that this pretended direct contemplation of the mind by
itself, is a pure illusion.

"Not a long while ago men imagined they had explained vision by
saying that the luminous action of bodies produces on the
retina pictures representative of external forms and colours.
To this the physiologists [query, the _physiologists_] have
objected, with reason, that if it was _as images_ that the
luminous impressions acted, there needed another eye within the
eye to behold them. Does not a similar objection hold good
still more strikingly in the present case?

"It is clear, in fact, from an invincible necessity, that the
human mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own.
For by whom can the observation be made? It is conceivable
that, relatively to moral phenomena, man can observe himself in