e of combining the forces
thus liberated and attacking one or more of the blockading fleets in
superior force before they can re-establish their own superiority by
concentration. Broadly speaking, this was the plan of operations
adopted, or rather attempted, by Napoleon in the memorable campaign
which ended at Trafalgar. It was frustrated by the persistent energy of
Nelson, by the masterly dispositions of Barham at the Admiralty, by the
tenacity with which Cornwallis maintained the blockade at Brest, and by
the instinctive sagacity with which other commanders of the several
blockading and cruising squadrons nearly always did the right thing at
the right moment, divined Barham's purpose, and carried it out almost
automatically. Practically, Napoleon was beaten and his projected
invasion of England was abandoned many weeks before Trafalgar was won.
But the command of the sea was not thereby secured to England. It needed
Trafalgar and the destruction of the French and Spanish Fleets there
accomplished to effect that consummation. England thenceforth remained
in effective and almost undisputed command of the sea, and the
Peninsular campaigns of Wellington were for the first time rendered
possible. The contrasted phases of the conflict before and after
Trafalgar are perhaps the best illustration in history of the vast and
vital difference between a command of the sea in dispute and a command
of the sea established. Trafalgar was the turning-point in the long
conflict between England and Napoleon.

CHAPTER III

DISPUTED COMMAND--BLOCKADE

I have so far treated blockade as the initial stage of a struggle for
the command of the sea. That appears to me to be the logical order of
treatment, because when two naval Powers go to war it is almost certain
that the stronger of the two will at the outset attempt to blockade the
naval forces of the other. The same thing is likely to happen even if
the two are approximately equal in naval force, but in that case the
blockade is not likely to be of long duration, because both sides will
be eager to obtain a decision in the open. The command of the sea is a
matter of such vital moment to both sides that each must needs seek to
obtain it as soon and as completely as possible, and the only certain
way to obtain it is by the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy.
The advantage of putting to sea first is in naval warfare the equivalent
or counterpart of the advantage in land w