dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that
Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life
will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre
should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus
which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with
me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with
myself, and contradict myself.

CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be
running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way
because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused
Gorgias:--for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if
some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know
justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that
he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased
if he answered 'No'; and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias
was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing
in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I
think; but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot
say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is more
dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which
led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say
what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates,
that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are
appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not
natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at
variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say
what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your
ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of
him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined
by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you
slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion
about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the
conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view
of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater
disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the
more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the