in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather
say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same
argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against
all men and upon any subject,--in short, he can persuade the multitude
better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should
not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his
reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric
fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having
become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his
instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or
banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his
instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who
ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his
instructor.
SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of
disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not
always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either
party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements
are apt to arise--somebody says that another has not spoken truly or
clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both
parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal
feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the
question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another
until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever
listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot
help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or
accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am
afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some
animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering
the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I
should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And
what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing
to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to
refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be
refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the
two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil
than of curing another. For I
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