Africa, if they want them;
and I defy any man on earth to show any distinction between the two
things,--to show that the one is either more wicked or more unlawful; to
show, on original principles, that one is better or worse than the other;
or to show, by the Constitution, that one differs a whit from the other.
He will tell me, doubtless, that there is no constitutional provision
against people taking slaves into the new Territories, and I tell him
that there is equally no constitutional provision against buying slaves
in Africa. He will tell you that a people, in the exercise of popular
sovereignty, ought to do as they please about that thing, and have slaves
if they want them; and I tell you that the people of Georgia are as much
entitled to popular sovereignty and to buy slaves in Africa, if they want
them, as the people of the Territory are to have slaves if they want them.
I ask any man, dealing honestly with himself, to point out a distinction.

I have recently seen a letter of Judge Douglas's in which, without stating
that to be the object, he doubtless endeavors to make a distinction
between the two. He says he is unalterably opposed to the repeal of the
laws against the African slave trade. And why? He then seeks to give a
reason that would not apply to his popular sovereignty in the Territories.
What is that reason? "The abolition of the African slave trade is a
compromise of the Constitution!" I deny it. There is no truth in the
proposition that the abolition of the African slave trade is a compromise
of the Constitution. No man can put his finger on anything in the
Constitution, or on the line of history, which shows it. It is a mere
barren assertion, made simply for the purpose of getting up a distinction
between the revival of the African slave trade and his "great principle."

At the time the Constitution of the United States was adopted, it was
expected that the slave trade would be abolished. I should assert and
insist upon that, if judge Douglas denied it. But I know that it was
equally expected that slavery would be excluded from the Territories, and
I can show by history that in regard to these two things public opinion
was exactly alike, while in regard to positive action, there was more done
in the Ordinance of '87 to resist the spread of slavery than was ever done
to abolish the foreign slave trade. Lest I be misunderstood, I say again
that at the time of the formation of the Constitution, public