y enters by
mistake, is ashamed; equally ashamed is a girl who encounters an
exhibitionist with his penis exposed. These examples suffice to show
that the sentiment of shame, which is associated with great discomfort,
is a safeguard against immorality and against breaches of custom.

Similar relations exist for the sense of disgust, which is allied to the
sense of shame. Shame is felt in the performance of an action disgusting
to others, if against one's will one is watched in the process.
Defaecation is usually effected in some retired place: in the onlooker,
defaecation arouses disgust; whilst by the person defaecating, if he knows
that he is being observed, shame is felt. Normal sexual intercourse
between a man and a woman, objectively regarded, is a no less unaesthetic
act than pseudo-coitus between two men. None the less, in most persons,
the sight of the former act arouses less disgust than that of the
latter. This difference depends upon the fact that by most persons
homosexual intercourse is also felt to be immoral. In this relationship
between the sense of disgust and immorality, it is often impossible to
determine what is primary and what is secondary. A mutual retroaction
occurs: the sense of disgust is increased, because the act is regarded
as immoral; and, on the other hand, a strong sense of disgust may
increase the perception of immorality. The same mutual relationships
with the ideas of morality are found in connexion with the sense of
shame. Beyond question, the sentiments of shame and of disgust are
closely connected with the ideas of custom and morality; for shame and
disgust arise especially in connexion with matters which conflict with
our ideas of morality. It will, therefore, readily be understood that in
moral education it is of the greatest importance what are the processes
in connexion with which the instructor seeks to arouse the sentiments of
shame and disgust; and, on the other hand, it is obvious that the ideas
of morality induced by education, favour the development, in certain
specific relationships, of the sentiments of shame and disgust.

It is a disputed question whether the sentiments of shame and disgust
are inborn. In this controversy, two matters are confused, between which
it is necessary to distinguish: the general disposition to experience
such sentiments, and the special disposition to react with these
sentiments to _specific_ occurrences. The fact is incontestable, that
the g