crossing his
hands over the breast, "Please don't come in, for I haven't got my shirt
on." Sikorsky rightly points out that this position of the arms is
typical of the sentiment of shame. Still, such cases are comparatively
rare; and in contrast with them we may often note that older children,
even girls of eight or a little more, will in play raise their
petticoats so high that it is necessary to turn away if we wish to avoid
seeing the genital organs, and often a word of reproof is needed from
the mother or nurse to indicate to the child that it is doing something
improper. The fact that in little children the sense of shame is so
little developed, but that subsequently this sentiment becomes clearly
manifest, has been used as an argument against the theory that it is
inborn; but this argument cannot be accepted without reserve, for an
inborn quality may not manifest itself until a certain definite age is
reached--as we see clearly in the case of the sexual impulse--and this
apart from the consideration that the development of an inborn quality
may be inhibited by influences acting during the individual life.
Whatever view we take of this problem, there can be no doubt as to the
possibility of exerting a marked influence upon both qualities, the
sentiment of disgust and the sentiment of shame, by means of influences
operating during the lifetime of the individual. Thus, by education and
habituation, it is possible to learn to repress disgust towards certain
animals or certain excreta, as is done by the physician, and by nurses,
male and female. The sentiment of disgust also depends largely upon
general customs. The civilised European makes a mock of the fact that
other races, certain oriental races, for instance, eat foods which to us
are disgusting. A European invited as a guest at certain foreign
banquets, is thoroughly disgusted when he sees food put into the mouth
with the fingers instead of with knife and fork. And yet there is no
great difference in respect of our own practice, when we put a piece of
chocolate, a grape, or the like, into our own mouths. If, in Europe, we
saw someone eating a pigeon in the same way as that in which we are
accustomed to eat a crayfish, many persons would experience disgust. And
yet, objectively considered, there is no reason to be less disgusted at
the eating of crayfishes than when some other kind of animal is eaten in
the same manner. Such modification of the sentiment of disgust