irty-eight were found dead on the field. Though
that was not a large number from a white man's point of view, the
Indians regarded the loss of thirty-eight of their warriors as no light
matter.
But that was not the heaviest blow to the confederation that Tecumseh
and the Prophet had worked so hard to establish. Tippecanoe had been
regarded with superstitious veneration as the Prophet's town, a sort of
holy city, under the special protection of the Great Spirit. The
destruction of the town, therefore, seriously affected the reputation of
the Prophet.
It is hard to tell what part the Prophet played in the attack on
Governor Harrison's forces. In their anxiety to escape punishment from
the United States government many Indians who were known to have taken
part in the battle excused their conduct by saying they had acted in
obedience to the Prophet's directions. They told strange stories of his
urging them to battle with promises that the Great Spirit would protect
them from the bullets of the enemy.
On the other hand, the Prophet said the young men who would not listen
to his commands were to blame for the trouble.
The fact that the Indians did not follow up their advantage over
Harrison, and instead of renewing the attack with their full force,
fled from him, would indicate that there certainly was a large party in
favor of peace. It seems probable that that party was made up of the
Prophet and his most faithful followers, rather than of those Indians
who, while pretending to be the friends of the United States and
accusing the Prophet, admitted that they had done the fighting.
Tenskwatawa had had advice from the British, and strict orders from
Tecumseh to remain at peace, and he had shown in many ways his anxiety
to appease Harrison and keep the Indians from doing violence. For some
time the influence of Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh had been more to restrain
and direct than to excite the anger of the Indians which had been
kindled by the treaty of 1809, and was ready to break out at any
instant. It is hard, too, to believe that young warriors who had never
been trained to act on the defensive could be constrained to wait until
they were attacked, and so lose the advantage to be gained by surprising
the enemy, or that they could be made to withdraw without striking a
blow.
But however blameless the Prophet may have been, he suffered for a time,
as Harrison had supposed he would. He was the scapegoat on whom all
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