ous kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them,
which was, nevertheless, a thoroughly friendly one, and no less
conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to
those of the British Power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which
secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally
ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have
fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence
and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formally applied. Our
advance frontier positions at Kandahar and Kuram have materially
diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India,
and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its
Ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to
the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to
maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.

Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our
forces from northern Afghanistan have hitherto been--_first_, the
excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul,
with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed
gatherings near Ghazni; and, _secondly_, the inability of the
Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a
Ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the
country.

The first-named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a
minute dated the 30th ultimo the Viceroy and Governor-General
stated that 'the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as
possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those
to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In
order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a Ruler for
Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps,' continued
His Excellency, 'are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile, it
is essential that we should make such a display of strength in
Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation,
and will overawe disaffection.'... 'All that is necessary, from a
political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to
Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the
neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir
Frederick Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined
have been accomplished by Gen