I. This statement of the case then, which we call the general one,
appears to us to have two divisions,--one judicial and one relating to
matters of fact. The judicial one is that in which the nature of right
and wrong, or the principles of reward and punishment, are inquired
into. The one relating to matters of fact is that in which the thing
taken into consideration is what is the law according to civil
precedent, and according to equity; and that is the department in
which lawyers are considered by us to be especially concerned.

And the judicial kind is itself also distributed under two
divisions,--one absolute, and one which takes in something besides as
an addition, and which may be called assumptive. The absolute division
is that which of itself contains in itself an inquiry into right and
wrong. The assumptive one is that which of itself supplies no firm
ground for objection, but which takes to itself some topics for
defence derived from extraneous circumstances. And its divisions are
four,--concession, removal of the accusation from oneself, a retorting
of the accusation, and comparison. Concession when the person on his
trial does not defend the deed that has been done, but entreats to be
pardoned for it: and this again is divided into two parts,--purgation
and deprecation. Purgation is when the fact is admitted, but when the
guilt of the fact is sought to be done away. And this may be on three
grounds,--of ignorance, of accident, or of necessity. Deprecation is
when the person on his trial confesses that he has done wrong, and
that he has done wrong on purpose, and nevertheless entreats to be
pardoned. But this kind of address can be used but very rarely.
Removal of the accusation from oneself is when the person on his trial
endeavours by force of argument and by influence to remove the charge
which is brought against him from himself to another, so that it may
not fix him himself with any guilt at all. And that can be done in
two ways,--if either the cause of the deed, or the deed itself, is
attributed to another. The cause is attributed to another when it is
said that the deed was done in consequence of the power and influence
of another; but the deed itself is attributed to another when it is
said that another either might have done it, or ought to have done it.
The retorting of an accusation takes place when what is done is said
to have been lawfully done because another had previously provoked
the doer w