contrary, I know that nothing
inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an
inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a
spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and
perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an
unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or
the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of
case between Spirit and Matter.
HYL. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think
the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually
perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?
Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, TO BE PERCEIVED is
one thing, and TO EXIST is another.
PHIL. _I_ am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world
for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder
cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees
and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him
why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you,
because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he
terms a real, being, and saith it IS OR EXISTS; but, that which is not
perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.
HYL. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists
in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.
PHIL. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist
without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed
between us.
HYL. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny
it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the
fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer
think you he would make?
PHIL. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of
his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say,
the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended
by (that is EXISTS IN) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at
first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this;
inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing,
implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The
question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a
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