actions, or
passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance--either
by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my
Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know
by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer
to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of MATERIAL
SUBSTANCE, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency.
But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist
in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is
repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should
be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is
granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative
knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not
thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances:
if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to
suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there
is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating
distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom
whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I
have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of
it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it
by reflexion.
HYL. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according
to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles,
it should follow that YOU are only a system of floating ideas, without
any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a
meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE than
in MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.
PHIL. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own
being; and that _I_ MYSELF am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a
thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates
about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both
colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a
colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from
colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible
things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of
the existence or essence of Matter. On the
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