re not only ignorant of the
true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be
denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot
be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think
on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that
it is impossible any REAL corporeal thing should exist in nature.
PHIL. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than
the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all
these extravagances by the belief of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE? This makes you
dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your
distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It
is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else
knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the
true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really
exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you
attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence,
wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the
end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or
nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own
hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real
existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the
deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas,
is it not as I say?
HYL. I agree with you. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was no more than an
hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my
breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or
whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it
will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you
upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant
it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to
the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.
PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at
all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave
things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things
are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I
know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of l
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