ar, as you know, is "to operate
upon the enemy's communications as much as possible, without exposing your
own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in
your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would
break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours?
You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he
gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do
but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall
upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer to Richmond than the enemy
is, by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach
there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a
march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The
roads are as good on yours as on his.

You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below
instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this
would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if
he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him
closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his
communications, and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him,
fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to
beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try,
we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither
north or south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot
beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we
bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth,
and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us
he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so
operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail
finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we
cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within
the entrenchments of Richmond.

[And, indeed, the enemy was let back into Richmond and it took another two
years and thousands of dead for McClelland cowardice--if that was all that
it was. I still suspect, and I think the evidence is overwhelming that he
was, either secretly a supporter of the South, or, what