Government.
Chapter XIII. Casuistry.
Chapter XIV. Ancient History Of Moral Philosophy.
Chapter XV. Modern History Of Moral Philosophy.
Index.
Footnotes
PREFACE.
This book has been prepared, particularly, for the use of the Freshman
Class in Harvard College. The author has, at the same time, desired to
meet the need, felt in our high schools, of a manual of Moral Science
fitted for the more advanced classes.
In the preparation of this treatise, the author has been at no pains to
avoid saying what others had said before. Yet the book is original, so far
as such a book can be or ought to be original. The author has directly
copied nothing except Dugald Stewart's classification of the Desires. But
as his reading for several years has been principally in the department of
ethics, it is highly probable that much of what he supposes to be his own
thought may have been derived from other minds. Of course, there is no
small part of the contents of a work of this kind, which is the common
property of writers, and must in some form reappear in every elementary
manual.
Should this work be favorably received, the author hopes to prepare, for
higher college-classes, a textbook, embracing a more detailed and thorough
discussion of the questions at issue among the different schools--past and
present--of ethical science.
Chapter 1.
ACTION.
An act or action is a voluntary exercise of any power of body or mind. The
character of an action, whether good or bad, depends on the intention of
the agent. Thus, if I mean to do my neighbor a kindness by any particular
act, the action is kind, and therefore good, on my part, even though he
derive no benefit from it, or be injured by it. If I mean to do my
neighbor an injury, the action is unkind, and therefore bad, though it do
him no harm, or though it even result to his benefit. If I mean to perform
an action, good or bad, and am prevented from performing it by some
unforeseen hindrance, the act is as truly mine as if I had performed it.
Words which have any meaning are actions. So are thoughts which we
purposely call up, or retain in the mind.
On the other hand, the actions which we are compelled to perform against
our wishes, and the thoughts which are forced upon our minds, without our
own consent, are not our actions. This is obviously true when our
fellow-men forcibly compel us to do or to hear things which we do no
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