George Anson's
letter, which was enclosed in yours of the 23rd, which I received just
as we were setting off for this place. Pray, when next you write to
George Anson, say how gratefully I appreciate the kind consideration
on the part of H.R.H. Prince Albert, which suggested George Anson's
communication. But I can assure you that although John Russell, in his
Audience of the Queen, may inadvertently have overstated the terms in
which he had mentioned to me what Her Majesty had said to him about
my return to the Foreign Office, yet in his conversations with me upon
that subject he never said anything more than is contained in George
Anson's letter to you; and I am sure you will think that under all the
circumstances of the case he could hardly have avoided telling me thus
much, and making me aware of the impression which seemed to exist upon
the Queen's mind as to the way in which other persons might view my
return to the Foreign Office.

With regard to Her Majesty's own sentiments, I have always been
convinced that Her Majesty knows me too well to believe for an instant
that I do not attach the greatest importance to the maintenance, not
merely of peace with all foreign countries, but of the most friendly
relations with those leading Powers and States of the world with which
serious differences would be attended with the most inconvenience. As
to Peace, I succeeded, as the organ of Lord Grey's Government and of
yours, in preserving it unbroken during ten years[42] of great and
extraordinary difficulty; and, if now and then it unavoidably happened
during that period of time, that in pursuing the course of policy
which seemed the best for British interests, we thwarted the views
of this or that Foreign Power, and rendered them for the moment less
friendly, I think I could prove that in every case the object which we
were pursuing was of sufficient importance to make it worth our while
to submit to such temporary inconvenience. There never was indeed,
during those ten years, any real danger of war except on three
occasions; and on each of those occasions the course pursued by the
British Government prevented war. The first occasion was just after
the accession of the King of the French, when Austria, Russia, and
Prussia were disposed and preparing to attack France, and when the
attitude assumed by the British Government prevented a rupture. The
second was when England and France united by a Convention to wrest the
Citadel