er to the people of
the United States, under cover to the Secretary of War. General
McClellan puts himself upon the country, and, after taking as much time
to make up his mind as when he wearied and imperilled the nation in his
camp on the Potomac, endeavors to win back from public opinion the
victory which nothing but his own over-caution enabled the Rebels to
snatch from him before Richmond. He cannot give us back our lost time
or our squandered legions; but how nice it would be if we would give
him back his reputation, which has never been of any great use to us,
and yet would be so convenient for him! It was made for him, and
accordingly fits him better than it would any one else. But it is
altogether too late. There is no argument for the soldier but success,
no wisdom for the man but to acknowledge defeat and be silent under it.
The Great Captain on his sofa at Longwood may demonstrate how the
Russian expedition might, could, would, and should have ended
otherwise; but meanwhile its results are not to be reasoned with,--the
Bourbons are at the Tuileries, and he at St. Helena. There is hardly
anything that may not be made out of history by a skilful manipulator.
Characters may be white-washed, bigotry made over into zeal, timidity
into prudence, want of conviction into toleration, obstinacy into
firmness; but the one thing that cannot be theorized out of existence,
or made to look like anything else, is a lost campaign.
We have had other unsuccessful generals, but not one of them has ever
been tempted into the indecorum of endeavoring to turn a defeat in the
field to political advantage. Not one has thought of defending himself
by imputations on his superiors. Early in the war General McDowell set
an example of silence under slanderous reproach that won for him the
sympathy and respect of whoever could be touched by self-reliant
manliness. It is because General McClellan has seen fit to overstep the
bounds of a proper official reserve, because, after more than a year
for reflection, he has repeated charges of the grossest kind against
those under whose orders he was acting, and all this from a political
motive, that we think his Report deserving of more than usual
attention. It will be no fault of his if he be not put in nomination
for the Presidency, and accordingly it becomes worth our while to
consider such evidences of character and capacity as his words and
deeds afford us.
We believe that General McClella
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