nditions? What
are the qualities of mind of which both his career and his Report give
the most irrefragable evidence?
General McClellan's mind seems to be equally incapable of appreciating
the value of time as the material of action, and its power in changing
the relations of facts, and thus modifying the basis of opinion. He is
a good maker of almanacs, but no good judge of the weather. Judging by
the political counsel which he more than once felt called upon to offer
the President, and which, as he has included it in his Report, we must
presume to represent his present opinions, he does not seem even yet to
appreciate the fact that this is not a war between two nations, but an
attempt at revolution within ourselves, which can be adequately met
only by revolutionary measures. And yet, if he were at this moment
elevated to the conduct of our affairs, he would find himself
controlled by the same necessities which have guided Mr. Lincoln, and
must either adopt his measures, or submit to a peace dictated by the
South. No side issue as to how the war shall be conducted is any longer
possible. The naked question is one of war or submission, for
compromise means surrender; and if the choice be war, we cannot afford
to give the enemy fifty in the game, by standing upon scruples which he
would be the last to appreciate or to act upon. It is one of the most
terrible features of war that it must be inexorable by its very nature.
Great statesmanship and great generalship have been more than once
shown by the same man, and, naturally enough, because they both result
from the same qualities of mind, an instant apprehension of the demand
of the moment, and a self-confidence that can as instantly meet it, so
that every energy of the man is gathered to one intense focus. It is
the faculty of being a present man, instead of a prospective one; of
being ready, instead of getting ready. Though we think great injustice
has been done by the public to General McClellan's really high merits
as an officer, yet it seems to us that those very merits show precisely
the character of intellect to unfit him for the task just now demanded
of a statesman. His capacity for organization may be conspicuous; but,
be it what it may, it is one thing to bring order out of the confusion
of mere inexperience, and quite another to retrieve it from a chaos of
elements mutually hostile, which is the problem sure to present itself
to the next administration. Thi
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