mind of its author. A man so vague in his conceptions
is apt to be timid in action, for the same haziness of mind may,
according to circumstances, either soften and obscure the objects of
thought, or make them loom with purely fantastic exaggeration. There is
a vast difference between clearness of head on demand and the power of
framing abstract schemes of action, beautiful in their correctness of
outline and apparent simplicity. It is a perception of this truth, we
believe, which leads practical men always to suspect plans supported by
statistics too exquisitely conclusive.

It was on precisely such a specious basis of definite misinformation
that General McClellan's next proposal for the campaign by way of the
Peninsula rested,--precise facts before he sets out turning to
something like precise no-facts when he gets there,--beautiful
completeness of conception ending in hesitation, confusion, and
failure. Before starting, "the roads are passable at all seasons of the
year, the country much more favorable for offensive operations than
that in front of Washington, much more level, the woods less dense, the
soil more sandy" (p. 47). After arriving, we find "the roads
impassable," "very dense and extensive forests, the clearings being
small and few;" and "the comparative flatness of the country and the
alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, rendered thorough
reconnoissances slow, dangerous, and difficult" (p. 79). General
McClellan's mental constitution would seem to be one of those, easily
elated and easily depressed, that exaggerate distant advantages and
dangers near at hand,--minds stronger in conception than perception,
and accordingly, as such always are, wanting that faculty of swift
decision which, catching inspiration from danger, makes opportunity
success. Add to this a kind of adhesiveness (we can hardly call it
obstinacy or pertinacity) of temper, which can make no allowance for
change of circumstances, and we think we have a tolerably clear notion
of the causes of General McClellan's disasters. He can compose a good
campaign beforehand, but he cannot improvise one out of the events of
the moment, as is the wont of great generals. Occasion seldom offers
her forelock twice to the grasp of the same man, and yet General
McClellan, by the admission of the Rebels themselves, had Richmond at
his mercy more than once.

He seems to attribute his misfortunes mainly to the withdrawal of
General McDowell's divis