s the real cause of its
own actions. It is capable of self-determination. The man's actions
are determined by his character. That is quite consistent with the
admission that God is the ultimate cause of a self of such and such a
character coming into existence at such and such a time.

(3) I will not say that the conception of those who regard the human
mind as literally a part of the divine, so that the human consciousness
is in no sense outside of the divine, is necessarily, for those who
hold it, inconsistent with the conception of {60} personality both in
God and man: I will only say that I do not myself understand such an
assertion. I regard the human mind as derived from God, but not as
being part of God. Further discussion of this question I reserve for
my next lecture.

We have led up to the idea of God's existence. But so far we have
discovered nothing at all about His character or purposes. And it is
clear that without some such knowledge the belief in God could be of
little or no value from any religious or moral point of view. How are
we to learn anything about the character of God? I imagine that at the
present day few people will attempt to prove the goodness or
benevolence of God from an empirical examination of the facts of Nature
or of History. There is, no doubt, much in History and in Nature to
suggest the idea of Benevolence, but there is much to suggest a
directly opposite conclusion. Few of us at the present day are likely
to be much impressed by the argument which Paley bases upon the
existence of the little apparatus in the throat by which it is
benevolently arranged that, though constantly on the point of being
choked by our food, we hardly ever are choked. I cannot help reminding
you of the characteristic passage: 'Consider a city-feast,' he
exclaims, 'what manducation, what deglutition, and yet not one Alderman
choked in a century!' Such arguments look at the matter from the point
{61} of view of the Alderman: the point of view of the turtle and the
turkey is entirely forgotten. I would not for a moment speak
disrespectfully of the argument from design. Darwinism has changed its
form, but anybody who reads Edouard von Hartmann's _Philosophy of the
Unconscious_ is not likely to rise from its perusal with the idea that
the evidences of design have been destroyed by Darwinism, whatever he
may think of Hartmann's strange conclusion that the design can be
explained by the operation