igen, believed that souls were pre-existent
but created.
[4] I use the word 'causally connected' in the popular or scientific
sense of the word, to indicate merely an actually observed
psycho-physical law.
[5] In part, perhaps, also to a mistaken theory of predication, which
assumes that, because every fact in the world can be represented as
logically a predicate of Reality at large, therefore there is but one
Substance or (metaphysically) Real Being in the world, of which all other
existences are really mere 'attributes.' But this theory cannot be
discussed here.
[6] In _The New Theology_.
[7] _E.g._ by Mr. Bradley in _Appearance and Reality_ and still more
uncompromisingly by Professor A. E. Taylor in _The Problem of Conduct_,
but I rejoice to find that the latter very able writer has recently given
up this theory of a 'super-moral' Absolute.
[8] I think it desirable to mention here that Professor Watson's account
of my views in his _Philosophical Basis of Religion_ completely
misrepresents my real position. I have replied to his criticisms in
_Mind_, N.S. No. 69 (Jan. 1909).
[9] This is sometimes denied by Philosophers, but I have never been able
to understand on what grounds. If I know _a priori_ the existence of
other men, I ought to be able to say _a priori_ how many they are and to
say something about them. And this is more than any one claims.
[10] In _Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'apres La Psychologie
et l'histoire_.
{127}
LECTURE V
REVELATION
I have tried in previous lectures to show that the apprehension of
religious truth does not depend upon some special kind of intuition;
that it is not due to some special faculty superior to and different in
kind from our ordinary intellectual activities, but to an exercise of
the same intellectual faculties by which we attain to truth in other
matters--including, however, especially the wholly unique faculty of
immediately discerning values or pronouncing moral judgements. The
word 'faith' should, as it seems to me, be used to express not a
mysterious capacity for attaining to knowledge without thought or
without evidence, but to indicate some of the manifold characteristics
by which our religious knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge
either of common life or of the physical Sciences. If I had time there
would be much to be said about these characteristics, and I think I
could show that the popular distinction
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