unassailable position than is afforded by an Idealism of the type
which I have most inadequately sketched.

Mr. Bradley in a cynical moment has defined Metaphysics as the 'finding
of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct.' I do not for myself
accept that definition, which Mr. Bradley himself would not of course
regard as expressing the whole truth of the matter. But, though I am
firmly convinced that it is possible to find good reasons for the
religious beliefs and hopes which have in fact inspired the noblest
lives, I still feel that the greatest service which even a little
acquaintance with Philosophy may render to many who have not the time for
any profounder study of it, will be to give them greater boldness and
confidence in accepting a view of the Universe which satisfies the
instinctive or unanalysed demands of their moral, intellectual, and
spiritual nature.

{123}

NOTE ON NON-THEISTIC IDEALISM

It may perhaps be well for the sake of greater clearness to summarize my
objections--those already mentioned and some others--to the system of Dr.
McTaggart, which I admit to be, for one who has accepted the idealistic
position that matter does not exist apart from Mind, the only
intelligible alternative to Theism. His theory is, it will be
remembered, that ultimate Reality consists of a system of selves or
spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a Unity, but not a
conscious Unity, so that consciousness exists only in the separate
selves, not in the whole:

(1) It is admitted that the material world exists only in and for Mind.
There is no reason to think that any human mind, or any of the other
minds of which Dr. McTaggart's Universe is composed, knows the whole of
this world. What kind of existence then have the parts of the Universe
which are not known to any mind? It seems to me that Dr. McTaggart would
be compelled to admit that they do not exist at all. The world
postulated by Science would thus be admitted to be a delusion. This
represents a subjective Idealism of an extreme and staggering kind which
cannot meet the objections commonly urged against all Idealism.

(2) Moreover, the world is not such an intellectually complete system as
Dr. McTaggart insists that it must be, apart from the relations of its
known parts to its unknown parts. If there are parts which are unknown
to any mind, and which therefore do not exist at all, it is not a system
at all.

(3) If it be said that a