ion, we feel ourselves to be an "I am I"
opposed to the universe and contrasted with the universe.

But all this happens simultaneously; and the consciousness that we
are ourselves implies, at one and the same time, the consciousness
that we _are_ the universe and the consciousness that we are
_inside_ the universe.

And precisely as the fact of self-consciousness implies the
primordial duality and contradiction of being at once the whole
universe and something inside the universe, so the original fact of
our thinking at all, implies the activity of the will.

We think because we are "thinking animals" and we will because
we are "willing animals." The presence of what we call motive is
something that comes and goes intermittently and which may or
may not be present from the first awakening of consciousness. We
_may_ think "I am I" at the very dawn of consciousness under the
pressure of a vague motive of clearing up a confused situation. We
_may_ use our reason at the very dawn of consciousness under the
pressure of a vague motive of alleviating the distress of disorder
with the comfort of order. But, on the other hand, self-consciousness
may play its part, reason may play its part and the will may play its
part in the complete absence of any definite motive. There is such a
thing--and this is the point I am anxious to make--as _motiveless_
will. Certain thinkers have sought to eliminate the will altogether by
substituting for it the direct impact or pressure of some motive or
motive-force. But if the will can be proved to be a primordial energy
of the complex vision and if the conception of a motiveless exertion
of the will is a legitimate conception, then, although we must admit
the intermittent appearance and disappearance of all manner of
motives, we have no right to substitute motive for will. If we do
make such a substitution, all we really achieve is simply a change of
_name_; and our new motive is the old will "writ small."

Motives undoubtedly may come and go from the beginning of
consciousness and the beginning of will. They may flutter like
butterflies round both the consciousness and the will. For instance it
is clear that I am not _always_ articulating to myself the notable or
troublesome thought "I am I." I may be sometimes so lost and
absorbed in sensation that I quite forget this interesting fact. But it
may easily happen at such times that I definitely experience the
_sensation of choice_; of choice