which they form
a part. That they cannot be regarded as absolutely separate is clear
from the fact that they can communicate with one another, not
only in human language but in a thousand more direct ways. But
granting this communication between them, does the mere
existence of myriads of independent personalities, living side by
side in a world common to all, justify us in speaking of the
original system of things as being pluralistic rather than monistic?

Human language, at any rate, founded on the fact that these
separate souls can communicate with one another, seems very
reluctant to use any but monistic terms. We say "the system of
things," not "the systems of things." And yet it is only by an act of
faith that human language makes the grand assumption that the
complex vision of all these myriad entities tells the same story.

We say "the universe"; yet may it not be that there are as many
"universes" as there are conscious personalities in this
unfathomable world? If there were no closer unity between the
separate souls which fill the universe than the fact that they are
able, after one primordial act of faith, to communicate with one
another, these monistic assumptions of language might perhaps be
disregarded and we might have a right to reject such expressions
as "system of things" and "cosmos" and "universe" and "nature."

But it still remains that they are connected, in space and in time,
by the medium, whatever it may be, which fills the gulfs between
the planets and the stars. As long as these separate souls are
invariably associated as they are, with physical bodies, and as long
as these physical bodies are composed of the same mysterious
force which we may call earth, fire, water, air, ether, electricity,
energy, vibration, or any other technical or popular name, so long
will it be legitimate to use these monistic expressions with which
human language is, so to speak, so deeply stained. As a matter of
fact we are not left with only this limited measure of unity. There
are also certain psychological experiences--experiences which I
believe I have a right to regard as universal--which bring these
separate souls into much closer connection.

Such experiences can be, and have been, ridiculously exaggerated.
But the undeniable fact that they exist is sufficient to prove that in
spite of the pluralistic appearance of things, there is still enough
unity available to prevent the Many from completely devourin