e the
greater when he might have the less.
We all agreed to every word of this.
Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and
here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would
agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.
Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear
and not terror.
Never mind about that, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if
our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears
when he need not? Would not this be in contradiction to the admission
which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears
to be evil? And no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he
thinks to be evil.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 59: From the "Protagoras," translated by Benjamin Jowett.
Protagoras, from whom this dialog gets its name, was one of the Greek
sophists, born about 481 B.C., and exiled from Athens on a charge of
atheism, his work entitled "On the Gods" being publicly burned. In the
dialog, which took place in the house of Calias, a wealthy Athenian
gentleman, besides Protagoras there were present other sophists,
including Hippias, Prodicus, Hippocrates, Alcibiades, and Critias.]
III
SOCRATES IN PRAISE OF LOVE[60]
And now I will take my leave of you, and rehearse the tale of love
which I heard once upon a time from Diotima,[61] of Mantinea, who was
a wise woman in this and many other branches of knowledge. She was the
same who deferred the plague of Athens ten years by a sacrifice, and
was my instructress in the art of love. In the attempt that I am
about to make, I shall pursue Agathon's method, and begin with his
admissions, which are nearly if not quite the same as I made to the
wise woman when she questioned me; this will be the easiest way, and I
shall take both parts myself as well as I can. For, like Agathon, she
spoke first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works.
And I said to her, in nearly the same words which he used to me, that
Love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I
proved to him that, in my way of speaking about him, Love was neither
fair nor good. "What do you mean, Diotima," I said; "is love then evil
and foul?" "Hush," she cried; "is that to be deemed foul which is not
fair?" "Certainly," I said. "And is that which is not wise ignorant?
Do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?"
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