gue the question
whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of
the Athenians; and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will
make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations
which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of
educating children, are, as I fear, only the doctrines of the
multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life if they were
able as they are to put them to death--and with as little reason. But
now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question
which remains to be considered is whether we shall do rightly either
in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying
them in money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly; and if
the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my
remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

_Crito_: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we
proceed?

_Socrates_: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either
refute me if you can, and I will be convinced, or else cease, my dear
friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes
of the Athenians; for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you,
but not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my
first position, and do your best to answer me.

_Crito_: I will do my best....

_Socrates_: Again, Crito, may we do evil?

_Crito_: Surely not, Socrates.

_Socrates_: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the
morality of the many; is that just or not?

_Crito_: Not just.

_Socrates_: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

_Crito_: Very true.

_Socrates_: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to
any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have
you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For
this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any
considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who
are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only
despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me,
then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that
neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever
right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you
decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still
my o