ould not mankind generally acknowledge that the art
which accomplishes this is the art of measurement?

Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of
odd and even, and on the knowledge of when men ought to choose the
greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other
whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principles of
our lives? Would not knowledge?--a knowledge of measuring, when the
question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when
the question is of odd and even? The world will acknowledge that, will
they not?

Protagoras admitted that they would.

Well then, I say to them, my friends, seeing that the salvation of
human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures
and pains--in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater
and the less, and the nearer and remoter--must not this measuring be a
consideration of excess and defect and equality in relation to one
another?

That is undeniably true.

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and
science?

They will agree to that....

Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful
evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his
distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable,
delightful, joyful. However and in whatever way he rejoices to name
them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer this in my
sense.

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.

Then, my friends, I said, what do you say to this? Are not all actions
the tendency of which is to make life painless and pleasant honorable
and useful? The honorable work is also useful and good.

This was admitted.

Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under
the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is
also attainable when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a
man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to
himself is wisdom.

They all assented.

And does not ignorance consist in having a false opinion and being
deceived about important matters?

To that they unanimously assented also.

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks
to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a
man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choos