y times. Possibly Joshua
used the words to suit the comprehension of the ignorant people;
possibly--as St. Augustine says--he commanded the whole system of the
celestial spheres to stand still, and his command to the moon rather
confirms this conjecture.

On the Copernican system interpretation is simplified; for if we
consider the mobility of the sun and how it is in a certain sense the
soul and heart of the universe, it is not illogical to say that it gives
not only light, but also motion to the bodies round it. In this manner,
by the standing still of the sun at Joshua's command, the day might be
lengthened without disturbing the order of the universe or the mutual
positions of the stars. This interpretation also explains the statement
that the sun stood still _in medio coeli_. Had the sun been in the
middle of the heavens in the sense of rising and setting, it had hardly
been necessary to check its course; but _in medio coeli_ probably
signifies in the middle or centre of the universe where it resides.

I have no doubt that other passages of the Scriptures could be likewise
interpreted in accordance with the Copernican system by divines with
knowledge of astronomy. They might say that the word "firmament" very
well agrees, _ad literam_, with the starry sphere. _Ad literam_, if they
admit the rotation of the earth, they might understand its poles, when
it is said _Nec dum terram fecerat, et flumina, et cardines orbis
terrae_. [Nor yet had He created the earth, or the rivers, or the hinges
for the globe of the earth.] Surely _cardines_, or "hinges," are
ascribed to the earth in vain if it be not to turn upon them.

* * * * *

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Hegel's "Philosophy of Religion" was published the year
following the philosopher's death, at Berlin, in 1832; and the
rugged shape and uneven construction of some of it may fairly
be attributed to the fact that, as it stands, it is largely an
editorial compilation. Such faults, however, as Dr. Edward
Caird has remarked, "if they take from the lectures as
expressions of their author's mind, and from their value as
scientific treatises, have some compensating advantages if we
regard them as a means of education in philosophy; for in this
point of view their very artlessness gives them something of
the same stimulating, suggestive power whic