istinguish the blue chips from the white; his deductions
must be relentless, and his inductions must be luminous. That is asking
a good deal, and it would be enough if his dealings were to be with
other scholars or with scholars in the making. The papers of a leisurely
recluse can be dug out by others from the even more deliberately
published proceedings of learned societies, even as the author has dug
out those of his predecessors, and ultimately the practical application
of his discoveries will be made. In national emergency, however, this
process will not suffice. The scholar must descend from his tower; he
must, if he is to serve effectively, learn to think to order and to do
it rapidly, to deal with all sorts and conditions of men; he must bear
with their amazing ignorances and profit by their equally amazing
knowledge of things of which he is ignorant. He must know the art of
team play. The war has brought out a new type of scholarship, or at any
rate has developed it to such an extent that its implications are new,
and that is the unselfish cooperation of experts to meet a given and
usually an immediately pressing need. The development of the Liberty
motor furnishes a good example of the results of such cooperative
effort. It seems to me that the most important single lesson which our
scholars can learn from the experience of the two past years is the
importance of this team play in scholarship, and not only team play with
other scholars, but team play with those who have the equally valuable
and perhaps even rarer gift of getting things done, who perhaps deserve
the title of scholars in the control of time and space. The scholars who
made good were those who had had not only the training and temperament
for research, but the training and temperament for working with other
people. The scholarship of the man who from self-centeredness or from a
mistaken absorption in his specialty lacked the art of dealing with his
fellow men was likely to prove a sterile scholarship, and in most cases
a useless scholarship in the day of national need.

One of the most dramatic things about the war was the speeding up of
supply and transport under the strong hand of the man who had brought
the Panama Canal to completion. General Goethals was no administrative
theorist. He was willing to try anything and anybody once, but he was
prompt in rejecting what did not promptly accomplish his purpose. An
engineer of General Goethals' distin