enna, and apprehensive of the event of an attack on
Warsaw. It was too thinly veiled not to be seen through. I therefore
answered, that I was fearful _the evil was done_; that if the king
and his ministers had acted up to the sentiments M. Hardenberg now
mentioned, or even if I saw a sincere disposition of doing it now, by
Moellendorff's army _really acting_, it certainly would be good
grounds to hope, but that this was not the case.

"Hardenberg employed every argument, and every _trick_, within the
narrow compass of his means, to persuade me they were earnestly
anxious to unite with us, and disposed to rectify their past
behaviour; but I remained firm, and absolutely declined giving in to
a belief of it.

"This led him to say _that we could not do without the Prussians_,
and that we _must_ continue the subsidy; that, therefore, it was
wisest and best to do it in the manner the most useful and
conciliatory. I replied, that without deciding on this strong
question of _necessity_, I could not but observe that, by stating it
as an argument, he brought his court on a level with the lowest
German prince, and supposed it to be actuated by principles like
those of the dey of Algiers; and that, if _necessity_ was to decide
the measure, it required no negotiation, it would do itself, and I
felt myself by no means in a rank to conduct _such_ a business."

On the 1st of October, instructions arrived from England to suspend the
subsidy; and on the 25th of the same month, Baron Hardenberg, on the part
of Prussia, declared the treaty at an end, which was followed by a direct
order from the king to withdraw his army altogether. On the 2d of
November, Lord Malmesbury received his recall.

We have been induced to dwell somewhat minutely upon this singular
negotiation, because its details have never yet been placed with
sufficient clearness before the public. We are now, for the first time,
admitted, through the medium of the Malmesbury papers, to a sight of the
hidden machinery, by means of which the colossal panorama of Europe was
made so ominously to revolve. Much is there, too, of importance, and
useful for the future, in the portraitures of national bad faith and
individual worthlessness which appear throughout the whole transaction.
Prussia was fortunate in her subsequent miseries. These, and these alone,
have made the pen o