By the partition of
Poland, that State had acquired the accession of a large and most valuable
territory, worth something surely by way of mortgage, or if not, at least
a ready magazine of supplies. But all this availed nothing. Prussia
professed herself ready to take whatever subsidy England, or any other
power, might furnish towards the maintenance of her troops--otherwise they
were not to reckon longer upon her co-operation and support. This
proposition was made broadly, shamelessly, and without any diplomatic
circumlocution. "Jacobi, Prussian minister, (at London,) gave in a kind of
memorial, expressive of his Prussian Majesty's intention not to grant the
succours we had asked for, and declining all general interference in the
war, _without being largely paid_." So much for defensive treaties!

At this crisis, the British ministry--fully impressed with the paramount
importance of isolating, in so far as might be, the republican contagion
within the confines of France, and preventing it from spreading
further--requested Lord Malmesbury, as the fittest and most experienced
diplomatist whose services they could command, to proceed on a special
mission to the court of Berlin, and attempt by every means in his power to
recall the king from his false and unnatural position. So great seemed the
necessity of accommodation, that England was inclined to accede, perhaps
too much, to the demands of her ally, rather than allow the war upon which
so much depended to be so meanly and pitifully abandoned. The following
extract from Lord Grenville's instructions will show the spirit which
actuated our ministry. "If the _alleged distress_ of the king of Prussia's
_treasury_ is wholly _feigned_, it will in that case be evident, that the
determination of the king of Prussia is taken rather to break his
alliance with the maritime powers, and to risk the dangers which may
result from the final establishment of the Jacobin principles in France,
than to contribute to the indemnification which Austria has in view. In
that case, all attempts at other arrangements must be useless, and nothing
will remain to be done, except to insist on the succours being
furnished; and, in case of non-compliance with that demand, to prepare the
declaration necessary to be given in for the purpose of annulling the
defensive treaty. If, on the other hand, the pecuniary difficulties which
are stated _have a real existence_, the disposition to co-operate further