the field. Of this sum England was to furnish
two-fifths, or L800,000; Austria and Holland, each one-fifth; and the
remainder was to be considered as an advance from Prussia, to be
reimbursed by France at the restoration of peace. Munificent as this
proposal may appear--and it really was so when the relative situation of
the parties is considered--it did not at first sight appear large enough
to satisfy the craving appetite of Frederick William, who, in a private
interview with Lord Malmesbury, had the assurance to demand for the
proposed succours no less a sum than _twenty millions_ of dollars, without
reckoning the "bread and forage!" The firm conduct and resolute tone of
Lord Malmesbury, seem at last to have convinced the rapacious monarch that
in grasping at too much he might lose all; and, after a great deal of
shabby negotiation and bargaining, a settlement was nearly effected on the
original terms. Austria, however, positively declined to become bound for
any part of the subsidy--we doubt not for sufficient reasons. Holland, in
more alarm, was willing to contribute her share; but so many impediments
were thrown in the way of a settlement by the machinations of the French
party at Berlin, that Lord Malmesbury found it indispensable to quit that
court and conclude the negotiation at the Hague. He was accompanied
thither by the Prussian minister, Haugwiz--a man whose character for
honesty must be left to the verdict of posterity--and on the nineteenth
April 1794, a treaty was concluded between Prussia, Holland, and England,
by which the former power was bound to furnish an army of 62,000 men,
under a Prussian commander-in-chief, to be subsidized by the other states,
and to serve against their common enemies. The maritime powers agreed to
pay his Prussian majesty L50,000 per month to the end of the year,
L300,000 to put the army in motion, and L100,000 on its return home. All
conquests made were to be at the disposal of the maritime powers.

Thus did Prussia, vaunting herself to be peculiarly the military power of
Europe, sell the services of her army for hire, with as little reservation
as ever did the mercenary troops of Switzerland or Brabant. The very idea
of such an individual transaction carries with it something degrading; as
a state-bargain, it is humiliation. One quality only can be brought
forward to redeem the sellers of their national armies from contempt, and
that is the most scrupulous fidelity to the cau