lliam I.; they reveal
themselves in the articles of journalists and in the writings of
historians; but above all, the German megalomania finds expression in
the seven thousand speeches and in the three hundred uniforms of the
Kaiser. In examining the influence of William II. we shall come to the
conclusion that it is his defects far more than his virtues that have
made him the representative hero of the German people. His winged
words voice the aspirations of his subjects. Like the Kaiser, every
German believes that he is 'the salt of the earth'--_Wir sind das Salz
der Erde_. Like Nietzsche, the modern German believes that the world
must be ruled by a super-man, and that he is the super-man. Like
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the German is convinced that he belongs
to a super-race, and that the Teuton has been the master-builder of
European civilization."

[5] See an amusing article, "Ornamente," in the _Zukunft_.

IX.--GERMAN SELF-ASSERTION.

"The self-assertion of the Germans and the contempt for the foreigner
reveal themselves in their political dealings with other nations.
German statesmen continue the methods of Bismarck without having his
genius. German politicians delight in shaking the mailed fist, in
waving the national banner with the Imperial black eagle, the ominous
and symbolical bird of prey. Wherever they meet with opposition they
at once resort to comminatory messages. Compare the methods of the
Emperor William with those of Edward VII. Nothing illustrates better
the differences between the characteristics of English and German
diplomacy than the dramatic contrast between the bragging, indiscreet,
impulsive, explosive manner of the Kaiser and the quiet, courteous
manner of the English monarch. Nothing explains better the striking
success which has attended English policy and the no less striking
failure which has attended German policy. For in international as well
as in private relations, intellectual superiority is often as
efficient a weapon as an appeal to brute force. And all the might of
the German Empire has not saved the German foreign policy from
persistent bankruptcy. That bankruptcy is unanimously admitted even in
Germany, and partly accounts for the present temper of the nation. The
times have changed, and even the weak cannot now be bullied into
submission. At the Algeciras Conference even those small nations whose
most obvious interest it was to side with Germany gave their moral
s