tate might be issued, and the other the judicial tribunals in which all
disputes as to such bonds might be _definitively_ settled, and payment
made, if the decree were against the State. That Constitution vested the
_whole judicial power of the State_ in the courts, it vested nothing but
'legislative power' in the Legislature, and it prohibited the
Legislature and Executive from exercising judicial power; it adopted the
great fundamental principle of constitutional government, separating the
executive, legislative, and judicial power. Indeed, it is the great
doctrine of American law, that the concentration of any of these two
powers, in any one body or functionary, is dangerous to liberty, and
that the _consolidation_ of all of these powers creates a despotism. The
interpretation of a law, and particularly of a constitution, which is
made the 'supreme law,' the _lex legum_, has uniformly been regarded as
exclusively a judicial, and not an executive or legislative function. In
this case, however, it has been made clear by an express provision of
the Constitution separating these functions, and designating, under its
mandate, the _courts_ in which _suits_ shall be brought against the
State, and the form of the decree to be rendered, and requiring payment
to be at once made. A suit is a judicial act, and so is the decree of a
court. Well, then, the highest judicial tribunals of Mississippi have
twice decided this question; they have declared this supplemental act
constitutional, these bonds valid, and the sale of them to be in
conformity with the law; and, in a suit on one of these very bonds,
after the fullest argument, the court entered a decree of payment,
overruling every point made by Jefferson Davis; and yet the State still
repudiates, as well after the first decision in 1842, as the second in
1853. It is difficult to imagine a more palpable infraction of the
Constitution, or a clearer violation of every principle of justice than
this.

The State prescribes certain forms under which her bonds may issue; she
adds to this, in the very _next section_, a provision _commanding_ the
Legislature to designate the judicial tribunals in which suit may be
brought on such bonds against the State; those tribunals are designated
by the Legislature, namely, the Court of Chancery, with appeal to the
High Court of Errors and Appeals of the State; both those tribunals
(including the Chancellor) have unanimously decided against the Stat