ch even cattle, if they could
speak, would call pleasure; or else, if he chose rather to speak in his
own style, than like

All the Greeks from high Mycenae,
All Minerva's Attic youth,

and the rest of the Greeks who are spoken of in these anapaests, then he
would call this freedom from pain alone by the name of pleasure, and would
despise the definition of Aristippus; or, if he thought both definitions
good, as in fact he does, he would combine freedom from pain with
pleasure, and would employ the two extremes in his own definition: for
many, and they, too, great philosophers, have combined these extremities
of goods, as, for instance, Aristotle, who united in his idea the practice
of virtue with the prosperity of an entire life. Callipho(28) added
pleasure to what is honourable. Diodorus, in his definition, added to the
same honourableness, freedom from pain. Epicurus would have done so too,
if he had combined the opinion which was held by Hieronymus, with the
ancient theory of Aristippus. For those two men disagree with one another,
and on this account they employ separate definitions; and, while they both
write the most beautiful Greek, still, neither does Aristippus, who calls
pleasure the chief good, ever speak of freedom from pain as pleasure; nor
does Hieronymus, who lays it down that freedom from pain is the chief
good, ever use the word "pleasure" for that painlessness, inasmuch as he
never even reckons pleasure at all among the things which are desirable.

VII. They are also two distinct things, that you may not think that the
difference consists only in words and names. One is to be without pain,
the other to be with pleasure. But your school not only attempt to make
one name for these two things which are so exceedingly unlike, (for I
would not mind that so much,) but you endeavour also to make one thing out
of the two, which is utterly impossible. But Epicurus, who admits both
things, ought to use both expressions, and in fact he does divide them in
reality, but still he does not distinguish between them in words. For
though he in many places praises that very pleasure which we all call by
the same name, he ventures to say that he does not even suspect that there
is any good whatever unconnected with that kind of pleasure which
Aristippus means; and he makes this statement in the very place where his
whole discourse is about the chief good. But in another book, in which he
utters opinions of