nd white marines. A series of shootings in and
around the town of Agana on Christmas Eve left a black and a white
marine dead. Believing one of the killed a member of their group,
black sailors from the Naval Supply Depot drove into town to confront
the outnumbered military police. No violence ensued, but the next day
two truckloads of armed Negroes went to the white Marine camp. A riot
followed and forty-three Negroes were arrested, charged with rioting
and theft of the trucks, and sentenced to up to four years in prison.
The authorities also recommended that several of the white marines (p. 093)
involved be court-martialed. These men too were convicted of various
offenses and sentenced.[3-120] Walter White went to Guam to
investigate the matter and appeared as a principal witness before the
Marine Court of Inquiry. There he pieced together for officials the
long history of discrimination suffered by men of the base company.
This situation, combined with poor leadership in the unit, he
believed, caused the trouble. His efforts and those of other civil
rights advocates led to the release of the black sailors in early
1946.[3-121]

[Footnote 3-120: Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Ralph W.
Donnelly, _Blacks in the Marine Corps_ (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 44-45.]

[Footnote 3-121: White's testimony before the Court
of Inquiry was attached to a report by Maj Gen
Henry L. Larsen to CMC (ca. 22 Jan 45), Ser. No.
04275, copy in CMH.]

[Illustration: SPECIALISTS REPAIR AIRCRAFT, _Naval Air Station,
Seattle, Washington, 1945_.]

A hunger strike developed as a protest against discrimination in a
Seabee battalion at Port Hueneme, California, in March 1945. There was
no violence. The thousand strikers continued to work but refused to
eat for two days. The resulting publicity forced the Navy to
investigate the charges; as a result, the commanding officer, the
focus of the grievance, was replaced and the outfit sent overseas.

The riots, mutinies, and other incidents increased the pressure for
further modifications of policy. Some senior officers became convinced
that the only way to avoid mass rebellion was to avert the (p. 094)
possibility of collective action, and collective action was less
likely if Negroes were dispersed among whites. As Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz, com