retary at war in three successive letters [379] _[See note 3
B, at the end of this Vol.]_, touching the relief of Minorca. Mr.
Fowke alleged in his own defence, that the orders were confused and
contradictory, and implied a discretionary power; that the whole number
of his garrison did not exceed two thousand six hundred men, after he
had spared two hundred and seventy-five to the ships commanded by
Mr. Edgecumbe; that the ordinary duty of the garrison requiring eight
hundred men, the whole number was not sufficient for three reliefs;
that, if he had detached a battalion on board the fleet, he should not
have had above two reliefs, at a time when he believed the place was
in danger of being attacked, for good reasons, which he did not think
himself at liberty to mention; that his orders being doubtful, he held a
council of war, which was of opinion, that as undoubted intelligence was
received of the French army's being landed at Minorca, to the number of
between thirteen and sixteen thousand men, and that a French squadron
of sixteen ships was stationed off the harbour, the sending a detachment
equal to a battalion from Gibraltar would be an ineffectual supply for
the relief of the place, and a weakening of the garrison from which
they must be sent. He observed, that supposing the orders to have
been positive, and seven hundred men detached to Minorca, the number
remaining at Gibraltar would not have exceeded one thousand five hundred
and fifty-six: a deduction of seven hundred more, according to the order
of May the twelfth, would have left a remainder of eight hundred
and fifty-six; that the men daily on duty in the garrison, including
artificers and labourers in the king's works, amounted to eight hundred
and thirty-nine; so that if he had complied with the orders as they
arrived, he would not have had more than seventeen men over and above
the number necessary for the daily work of the garrison; thus the
important fortress of Gibraltar must, at this critical conjuncture, have
been left almost naked and defenceless to the attempts of the enemy; and
had those detachments been actually sent abroad, it afterwards appeared
that they could not have been landed on the island of Minorca. The order
transmitted to general Fowke to detain all empty vessels, for a further
transportation of troops, seems to have been superfluous; for it can
hardly be supposed he could have occasion for them, unless to embark the
whole garrison, an