ts
present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this
point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and
hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political
relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course
of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to
political paralysis at the time when the great European States built
themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not
enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in
politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long
concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural
development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power,
international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What
we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior
force of hostile interests and Powers.

It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths
we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our
forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the
straight road of our intended development.

The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an
advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension,
it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often
follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to
stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every
occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will
be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword.

CHAPTER V

WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL

In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its
history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted
to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the
Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions,
must be the basis of our future development.

The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international
relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the
impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character
and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even
at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and
our duty. The longer we look at things with fold