intimately related that the monist
believes them to be connected as are the lungs and respiration, the hand
and grasping, or the eye and the reception of visual impressions from
without.

But whichever one of these explanations we choose to adopt as our own, the
basic fact of primary importance is that there is an invariable dependence
of human thought upon a brain comprising a highly developed cerebrum,
whatever may be the ultimate nature of the way mental processes are
determined by physical processes, or _vice versa_. This fact stands
unquestioned and unassailable; human faculty and the brain cannot be
considered apart, even if they may not actually be different aspects of
the same basic "mind-stuff," as Clifford calls the ultimate dual thing.

Like all of the other organs of lesser importance belonging to the nervous
system, the brain is a complex of tissues which in the last analysis are
groups of cell-bodies with their fibrous prolongations. When these
cellular elements are in operation, mental processes go on; the unit of
the mental process therefore is the functioning of a brain-cell. But we
know that the substance of a brain-cell is the wonderful physical basis of
life called protoplasm, that demanded our attention at the outset. The
chemicals that go to make up protoplasm are everywhere carbon, hydrogen,
oxygen, and other substances that are exactly the same outside the body as
inside. It is the combination of these substances in a peculiar way which
makes protoplasm, and it is the combination of their individual properties
which in a real even though unknown manner gives the powers to protoplasm,
even to that of a living brain-cell. Does science teach us, then, that the
ultimate elements of human faculty are carbon-_ness_ and hydrogen-_ness_,
and oxygen-_ness_, which in themselves are not mind, but which when they
are combined, and when such chemical atoms exist in protoplasm, constitute
mental powers? Plain common-sense answers in the affirmative. We need not,
indeed, we must not, attribute mind as such to rock salt or to the water
of a stream, but we do know that salts and water and other dead substances
may enter into the composition of the material brain which is the physical
basis of mind.

In my opinion the individual argument renders the monistic conception of
mind and matter unassailable. The food that we may eat and the water we
may drink are dead, and as such they display absolutely no evidence of