gible.--Vain "realities" and trustworthy "fictions"

CHAPTER V--NATURE UNIFIED AND MIND DISCERNED Pages 118-136
Man's feeble grasp of nature.--Its unity ideal and discoverable
only by steady thought.--Mind the erratic residue of
existence.--Ghostly character of mind.--Hypostasis and criticism
both need control.--Comparative constancy in objects and in
ideas.--Spirit and sense defined by their relation to
nature.--Vague notions of nature involve vague notions of
spirit.--Sense and spirit the life of nature, which science
redistributes but does not deny

CHAPTER VI--DISCOVERY OF FELLOW-MINDS Pages 137-160
Another background for current experience may be found in alien
minds.--Two usual accounts of this conception criticised: analogy
between bodies, and dramatic dialogue in the soul.--Subject and
object empirical, not transcendental, terms.--Objects originally
soaked in secondary and tertiary qualities.--Tertiary qualities
transposed.--Imputed mind consists of the tertiary qualities of
perceived body--"Pathetic fallacy" normal, yet ordinarily
fallacious.--Case where it is not a fallacy.--Knowledge succeeds
only by accident.--Limits of insight.--Perception of
character.--Conduct divined, consciousness ignored.--Consciousness
untrustworthy.--Metaphorical mind.--Summary

CHAPTER VII--CONCRETIONS IN DISCOURSE AND IN EXISTENCE Pages 161-183
So-called abstract qualities primary.--General qualities prior to
particular things.--Universals are concretions in
discourse.--Similar reactions, merged in one habit of reproduction,
yield an idea.--Ideas are ideal.--So-called abstractions complete
facts.--Things concretions of concretions.--Ideas prior in the
order of knowledge, things in the order of nature.--Aristotle's
compromise.--Empirical bias in favour of contiguity.--Artificial
divorce of logic from practice.--Their mutual
involution.--Rationalistic suicide.--Complementary character of
essence and existence

CHAPTER VIII--ON THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THINGS AND IDEAS Pages 184-204
Moral tone of opinions derived from their logical
principle.--Concretions in discourse express instinctive
reactions.--Idealism rudimentary.--Naturalism sad.--The soul akin
to the eternal and ideal.--Her inexperience.--Platonism
spontaneous.--Its essential fidelity to the ideal.-