he enemy
returned to port, I should make an attempt on them on the first dark
night with the flagship alone, pending the equipment of the fireships.
At the same time I addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister,
De Andrada:--

Moro San Paulo, 26th May, 1823.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

With regard to the transactions of the squadron, I beg to refer you
to my despatches to the Minister of Marine, but solicit your
attention to a few particulars which appear to me of importance.

In the first place, you will observe from the enclosed Bahia
newspaper, that the maritime force of the enemy is contrasted with
that of the squadron under my command. I should be well content were
the real disparity of the respective forces no greater than the
statement has set forth, but unfortunately, the Brazilians, who have
never before been at sea, are of little or no use, from their total
want of discipline, and of any kind of nautical knowledge; whilst
the Portuguese seamen in the squadron, are not only useless--but a
great deal worse, for the reasons stated in my former letters.

The enemy in Bahia are in want of all kinds of fresh provisions
--though they have been using every means to procure them. Some
supplies they have lately had from Buenos Ayres, and even from the
Cape de Verds; but the most surprising fact is that the Brazilian
Governor of San Mattheos, near the Abrolhos, and the chiefs of other
small Brazilian ports in that quarter have been loading vessels for
the enemy's use--under the simulated destination of Rio de Janeiro.
Permit me to suggest that an investigation into this matter is
highly essential.

From all the information which I can collect, the enemy at Bahia are
considerably distracted in their councils, which dissensions cannot
fail to be increased by seeing their vessels taken in the very mouth
of the harbour, and their look-out ships driven under the guns of
the batteries by those of His Imperial Majesty, I may, indeed, say
by two ships alone, because in the state of the other vessels and
crews I have not deemed it prudent to trust them in the
neighbourhood of a port occupied by the enemy.

I have no doubt of succeeding--by some means or other--in effecting
our object, and that in as short a time as can reasonably be
expected--for it is not to be supposed that I shou