n his
consulship from one man, or his status as a senator from another, he
could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws. So that
the senate, the consuls, and the tribunes continuing to exist with
undiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the right
road. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took
place. For on their appointment, consuls and tribunes were swept away,
and express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and do
whatever else they thought fit, with the entire authority of the whole
Roman people. So that finding themselves alone without consuls or
tribunes to control them, and with no appeal against them to the people,
and thus there being none to keep a watch upon them, and further being
stimulated by the ambition of Appius, in the second year of their office
they began to wax insolent.

Let it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that authority given by
the public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth, it is assumed
that the people will never be led to confer that authority without due
limitations, or for other than a reasonable term. Should they, however
either from being deceived or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow
authority imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten, it will
always fare with them as with the Romans. And this may readily be
understood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the dictator good,
what to make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics which
have been accounted well governed, have acted when conferring authority
for an extended period, as the Spartans on their kings and the Venetians
on their doges; for it will be seen that in both these instances the
authority was controlled by checks which made it impossible for it to
be abused. But where an uncontrolled authority is given, no security
is afforded by the circumstance that the body of the people is not
corrupted; for in the briefest possible time absolute authority will
make a people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends and partisans. Nor
will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority is vested, that
he is poor and without connections, for wealth and every other advantage
will quickly follow, as shall be shown more fully when we discuss the
appointment of the Ten.

CHAPTER XXXVI.--_That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a
Commonwealth should not disdain the lower_.

Under the consuls M. Fabius and Cn. Man